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Infringement Lawsuits: The Continuing
Battle Between Patent Law and Antitrust

Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Lisa M. Natter*
There are certain agreements ...

which because of their

pernicious effect on competition... are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to
the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.'
Justice Black

Introduction

I.

The average cost of a drug prescription in the United States in
2004 was $96.2 The average cost of a prescription for the generic
equivalent, containing the same active ingredients, was $29.
* Lisa Natter, J.D. candidate, May 2007, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law; B.A. in Psychology and B.A. in German Languages and Literature, 1998,
Northwestern University.
1
2

Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
U.S. Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 2006, Section

3 Health & Nutrition, Table 126, (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2005pubs/06statab/health.pdf.
3 Id.
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American drug prices are the highest in the world, and as a result
roughly two million Americans have turned to other countries such as
Canada, generating an $800 million online market for Canadian
pharmacies. 4 To address this aspect of the health care crisis, Congress
has enacted legislature to ensure that generic drugs can enter the
marketplace quickly and be available to the consumer.5 Yet, there are
instances where business agreements not to compete arise between a
brand-name drug manufacturer and a generic drug manufacturer
under the umbrella of patent infringement laws. These agreements
have the direct effect of blocking consumer access to the less
expensive generic alternatives.
The courts are split as to how to analyze these agreements for
potential antitrust liability. On one hand, there is the desire to protect
the exclusivity of a patent in an effort to further promote the research
and development of new drugs. 6 On the other, such blatant
agreements not to compete violate antitrust laws under the Sherman
Act and ultimately have a negative impact on the consumer.7
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari
in order to decide whether it is unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act for a pharmaceutical patentee to pay a competitor to keep the
competitor's generic drug off the market during pending litigation
between the patentee and the competitor. 8 The Sixth Circuit held that
such an agreement is inherently a horizontal agreement to eliminate
competition for the drug in question, and is therefore unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act.9 In direct contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held
that such agreements were not unlawful per se, in part because the
4 Clifford Krauss, Canadais Drafting Regulations to Curb Bulk Drug Exports
to US., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at All; see also CBS News, 60 Minutes,
Prescriptions and Profit, Mar. 14, 2004, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/08/19/60minutes/main637050.shtml.
5 See generally Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (West, 2006); See also
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, §§ 1101-2, 1112 (2003).
6 Yee Wah Chin & Kathryn E. Walsh, Antitrust Counseling in Intellectual

PropertyLicensing, at 267, 271 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 832, 2005).
7 Id.

8 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied sub nom., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004); Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 939 (2004).
9 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908.

Infringement Lawsuits

2006]

exclusion of infringing competition "is the essence of the patent
grant." 0 In its analysis, the court stated that it was not applying a rule
of reason standard, but then held that a factual inquiry assessing the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement was necessary before
determining if antitrust laws had been violated.' 2 The question
becomes whether such agreements between brand-name drug
manufacturers and their generic competitors are unlawful per se, or
whether courts must apply a rule of reason standard to each
individual set of circumstances, and how either standard would affect
the drug manufacturers and eventually the consumer.
This article will examine the circuit split and consider both
ways of analyzing a patent infringement suit for antitrust liability.
Part II of this article provides a background to the antitrust and patent
law that comes into play in the analysis of this issue, and specifically
explains the development of the Hatch-Waxman act and how a patent
infringement suit develops under current law. Part III discusses the
two primary cases illustrating the circuit split: In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation, in the Sixth Circuit, and Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals,in the Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, Part
III summarizes an opinion drafted by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), in the matter of Schering-Plough Corporation, which further
highlighted the circuit split, and suggested the current opinion of the
FTC. Finally, Part IV suggests that the Sixth Circuit's decision in the
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation holding that such horizontal
agreements are unlawful per se is the better decision because it is
consistent with consumer-protecting legislation and is not unfairly
restrictive to brand-name drug manufacturers.

II.

Background

The primary background issues that are relevant to the circuit
split are the antitrust principles embodied in the Sherman Act and the
FDA's requirements for introducing new and generic drugs to the
market under the Hatch-Waxman Act. An understanding of these
laws and regulations highlights how courts are having difficulty
balancing the protection of patent owners' exclusivity rights against
the well-established principles of antitrust law.

10

Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1306.

"

See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the rule of reason standard.
ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1306.

12
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A. Analysis of Antitrust Liability Under the Sherman Act: Rule
of Reason versus Unlawful Per Se
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." 13 While

the language of the statute is absolute in prohibiting all such
agreements, it has been consistently interpreted as Congress' intent
only to outlaw "unreasonable restraints."' 14 Because a court must
determine what is "unreasonable," most antitrust claims are analyzed
according to the rule of reason standard, under which the finder of
fact takes several factors into consideration including details about
the relevant business at hand, its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed, and the nature, history, and effect of the
restraint.15
There are, however, situations in which a restraint on trade is
considered unlawful per se under the Sherman Act because it will
have such a predictable and egregious anticompetitive effect.' 6 In
particular, applying per se treatment is appropriate when experience
with a particular kind of restraint would allow the court to
confidentlyPpredict that the rule of reason would likely condemn such
a restraint. A classic example of a per se violation of the Sherman
Act is what is known as a "horizontal" agreement between
competitors at the same level of the market structure to minimize
competition. 18 These agreements between competitors, such as pricefixing or territory allocations, are viewed as more dangerous than
vertical agreements between persons at different levels of the market
structure, such as manufacturers and distributors.' 9 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that such horizontal agreements to allocate
territories are "naked restraints
of trade with no purpose except
20
competition.,
of
stifling
Applying antitrust standards to intellectual property rights,
'3

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).

14 State
15 Id.
16 Id.

17 Id.
18

U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).

19 Id.
20

Id. (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
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and specifically, to patent law presents unique issues because the
courts must balance the constitutionally protected exclusivity rights
extended to patent owners against the antitrust laws embodied in the
Sherman Act. The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have
provided some guidelines when it comes to analyzing the intersection
between antitrust law and patent law, in an attempt to provide
guidance to various industries. 21 The publications attempt to define
markets as they may be relevant to antitrust analysis, and also discuss
the role of patents, the courts, and the impact of various intellectual
property licensing practices on consumer welfare.22 However, these
guidelines only indicate the position of the federal enforcement
agencies and are not binding authority, and, while they tend to be
consistent with prior court decisions, there are some areas where they
deviate from case law precedent.23 As a result, there is still great
uncertainty in how protecting an exclusivity period for inventors is
best accomplished without violating antitrust laws established under
the Sherman Act.
B. The Pharmaceutical Industry: Development and Introduction
of Drugs to the Market
In the pharmaceutical industry, there are drug manufacturers
known as "pioneers," or "innovators" who conduct research and
development and introduce new drugs to the market. 24 Additionally,
there are generic drug manufacturers that research and develop copies
25
the
drugs
containtreat
These generic
brand-name
drugs.
those
pioneer
of
drug and
therefore
as the
brand-name
ingredients
same
active

21

Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 274. See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice &

the FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (1992) (outlining the agencies'
enforcement policy concerning horizontal acquisitions and mergers), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Justice & the
FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, (2000)
(explaining how the agencies analyze antitrust issues raised by collaborations
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
available at
competitors),
among
ftcdojguidelines.pdf; FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
available at
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm.
22 Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 275.
23

Id. at 274.

Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch- Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586-87 (2003).
24

25 Id.
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the same ailments, and they generally vary only in the inactive
ingredients.26 The generic drugs cost significantly less than the
pioneer brand-name drugs, and it is the competition that arises
between the two that highlights the tension between patent law and
antitrust law.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) was
passed in 1938, creating what is now the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which is responsible for reviewing the safety
of any new drug before it is marketed to the public.27 According to
the FDCA, any drug manufacturer attempting to market a new
product must submit a new drug application (NDA) demonstrating
scientific studies showing that the new drug is safe for human
consumption. 28 Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
information related to a drug's safety and effectiveness was
considered confidential in order to prevent generic manufacturers
from introducing similar drugs to the market without having to bear
the initial costs borne by the pioneer manufacturer.29 As a result, a
generic drug applicant had to conduct time-consuming and expensive
research that likely was merely duplicating the studies already
conducted by the brand-name manufacturer. This was inefficient and
delayed the introduction of generic drugs to the marketplace.
C. The Hatch-Waxman Act: How a Patent Infringement Suit
Develops
In the 1980s, concern began to grow in regard to the
escalating cost of the average price of pharmaceuticals, and the
prevailing thought was that increasing competition would help drive
the costs back down. 30 As a result, the Hatch-Waxman Act was
passed in 1984 and was intended by Congress to balance two
competing interests: "to induce brand name pharmaceutical firms to
make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug
products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring
cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market." There were two
26

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied sub nom., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
27 Danzis, supra note 24, at 587.
28 Id.
29 Id.

31
3

Id. at 590.
Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990). See Hatch-
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major changes that initially resulted from the enactment of this
legislation, both of which acted to encourage the development of
generic drug competition in the marketplace. First, it was no longer a
patent infringement to use patented drugs for the testing of possible
generic drugs.3 2 Second, generic drug manufacturers had an incentive
to develop these drugs because the Act guaranteed them a period of
exclusivity, during which other generic firms were blocked from
competing with the same drug in the marketplace.33 However, also
inherent in the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act was a process
that increased the likelihood of patent infringement litigation brought
by the brand-name manufacturer, and therefore the unintended
incentive for
34 the parties involved to agree to reverse payment
settlements.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, instead of filing an NDA, a
generic drug manufacturer now only has to file an abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA).35 In order to be approved, the generic drug
manufacturer must certify that the generic drug is not infringing any
patent covering an approved drug and is the same, or the
"bioequivalent," to a drug already listed with an approved NDA in
the FDA's "Orange Book."3 6 There are several ways to certify that
the generic drug will not infringe an existing patent, including a
"paragraph IV certification," stating that the existing patent for the
pioneer drug is invalid or "will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale" of the generic drug for which the ANDA is being
submitted.37
Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (West, 2006).
32 Danzis, supra note 24, at 605 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act reversed
the decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm., Co. which had held that use
of a patented drug for testing and investigation related to FDA drug approval
requirements was an act of patent infringement).
33 Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving
Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of illegality in Light of
Some Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1077 (2004).
34 Id.

" Id. at 1076; 21 U.S.C. §3550).
36 Danzis, supra note 24, at 594-95; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). The FDA issues
a publication entitled Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, more commonly known as the "Orange Book," that contains a list of
at
available
(2006),
Book
FDA,
Orange
patents.
approved
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm.
37 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). The other ways of satisfying the certification
requirement are to state that patent information for the pioneer drug has not been
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An applicant filing a paragraph IV certification must give
notice to the original patent holder, who then has forty-five days to
file a patent infringement suit against the ANDA applicant. 38 If the
patent holder of the pioneer drug does file suit, it obtains an
automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the ANDA, unless
before thirty months a court finds that the patent is invalid or not
infringed. 39 Originally, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, in an attempt
to balance the impact of this thirty-month stay on the generic
applicant, other generic manufacturers were blocked from competing
in the market for that drug until 180 days after the first ANDA
applicant began selling its product or the NDA applicant's patent was
held to be either invalid or not infringed.4 °
However, the procedures for filing an ANDA that arose out of
the Hatch-Waxman Act had the unintended consequence of
encouraging patent infringement suits brought by the brand-name
drug manufacturer, and ultimately encouraging some anticompetitive
reverse-payment settlements. 4 1 First, the fact that a paragraph IV
certification even exists suggests that it is not out of the question that
patents filed by the pioneer drug manufacturer are invalid. Studies
have shown that more than a quarter of litigated pharmaceutical
patents may be invalid, and a July 2002 study conducted by the FTC
suggested that almost seventy-five percent of the ANDA applicants

filed, Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I), that the patent for the pioneer drug has expired,
Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II),or that the patent for the pioneer drug will expire on a
specified date Id at § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
38 Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied sub nom., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004) (citing 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)).
40 Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iv)). The exclusivity period was
39

amended with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 which made some significant changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, §§ 1101, 1102, 1112 (2003). These changes included
the creation of certain events that would cause generic manufacturers to forfeit their
180-day exclusivity period, clarification that pioneer drug manufacturers are
entitled to only one thirty-month stay per drug, and identification of certain
settlement agreements between drug manufacturers that must be reported to the
FTC and the Department of Justice. Id.
41 Cotter, supra note 33, at 1077.
42

Id. at 1078.
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whose cases had reached a decision at that time were victorious.43
Second, the pioneer drug manufacturer who owns the patent has an
incentive to sue regardless of the strength of its case because the
thirty-month stay will be automatically triggered. 4 Finally, patent
owners with a low probability of winning their patent infringement
suit are likely interested in settling the case in exchange for reverse
payments to the generic drug applicant, because the patent owner's
potential loss often greatly exceeds the generic applicant's potential
gain from marketing the substitute drug.
In fact, a reverse payment agreement may be appealing to
both parties if the patent owner's potential loss exceeds the generic
applicant's potential gain by a significant enough amount.46
However, this is where the antitrust liability issues arise because if
the generic applicant has a good chance of winning the infringement
suit, the patent owner is then simply paying the generic applicant not
to compete, in other words to stay out of a market that it likely has a
right to enter.47 Therefore, while both parties may benefit financially
from entering into the non-compete agreement, the party ultimately
feeling the negative impact is the consumer, who does not have
access4 8 to the less expensive, and likely equally beneficial, generic
drug.

III. The Circuit Courts Split: Unlawful Per Se or Case
by Case Analysis?
The courts are split as to whether reverse payment agreements
violate antitrust laws or are merely an extension of patent protection
laws. On one hand, there is the desire to protect the exclusivity of a
patent in an effort to further promote the research and development of
new drugs. 49 On the other, such blatant agreements not to compete
violate antitrust laws under the Sherman Act and ultimately have a

43

Id. (citing FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC

Study, (2002), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O2/O7/genericdrugstudy.pdf).
44

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

45

Cotter, supra note 33, at 1079-80.
Id. at 1080.

46

47 Id.

48 ld.
49

Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 271.
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negative impact on the consumer.50 In each of the cases highlighting
the circuit split, the circumstances leading to litigation were similar,
but the courts reached very different conclusions. The FTC provided
its viewpoint in the Schering-Plough opinion, 5 1 which further
highlighted the split. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to grant
certiorari and settle the matter.
A. In re Cardizem CD Litigation: Non-Compete Agreements are
Per Se Illegal Restraint of Trade in Violation of Sherman Act
In 2004 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, where the Sixth Circuit held that a
patent owner's reverse payment to settle a suit against the defendant
generic applicant was a horizontal market allocation agreement, and
therefore unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. 52 Hoechst Marion
Roussel (HMR) was the manufacturer of Cardizem CD, a brandname drug used to treat hypertension and to prevent heart attacks and
strokes. 53 In 1995, Cardizem CD was experiencing sales of over $700
million annually, and HMR's patent for the active ingredient in
Cardizem had expired in November 1992. 54 In September 1995,
Andrx filed an ANDA seeking approval to manufacture and market a
generic alternative, and thus became eligible for the 180-day
exclusivity period under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 55 HMR,
anticipating that the generic drug competition would lead to a forty
percent drop in Cardizem sales, filed a patent infringement suit
against Andrx that triggered the thirty-month stay of FDA approval,
which would end in July 1998.56
In September 1997, the FDA approved Andrx's ANDA for
the generic drug, which meant that it would be completely approved
as soon as either the thirty-month stay had expired, or earlier if a
50 Id.
51 In re Schering-Plough Corp., (Opinion of the Comm'n), No. 9297, slip op.
at 29, 2003 WL 22989651 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter FTC Opinion], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf.
52 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied sub nom., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
53 Id. at 901.
54
55
56

Id.; Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 303.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902.
Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 303. HMR based the suit on a U.S. patent

issued in November 1995. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902.
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court found that HMR's patent had not been infringed.57 However,
roughly one week after the FDA's approval, HMR and Andrx entered
into an agreement providing that (1) Andrx would not market its
generic drug even after its ANDA was approved at the end of the
thirty-month stay, (2) Andrx would not forfeit or transfer its 180-day
exclusivity period to another generic applicant, and (3) Andrx would
refrain from marketing any non-infringing generic drugs that it might
develop. 58 In return, HMR agreed to pay Andrx $10 million quarterly
beginning from the time the ANDA was approved, and an additional
$60 million annually beginning July 1998 and continuing until the
lawsuit was finally decided. 59 When the thirty-month waiting period
finally expired in July 1998, as per the terms of its agreement, Andrx
did not begin to market its generic product even though it had
received final approval from the FDA, and HMR began making the
$10 million quarterly payments as promised.6 °
In September 1998, Andrx supplemented its previously filed
ANDA to request approval for a reformulated generic version of
Cardizem CD, and in February 1999 certified to HMR that the
reformulated drug did not infringe the patent originally at issue. In
June 1999, the FDA approved Andrx's reformulated drug, and HMR
and Andrx agreed to settle the patent infringement case and terminate
their earlier agreement. 62 At that time, including its final payment,
HMR had paid Andrx a total of roughly $90 million and after its
release, Andrx's generic substitute for Cardizem began to capture a
substantial portion of the market and was selling at a significantly
lower price than Cardizem CD.63
In August 1998, just one month after the original thirty-month
stay had expired and Andrx had received full approval to market its
generic drug, a complaint was filed by direct and indirect purchasers
64
drug challenging the legality of the agreement.
of the Cardizem
In reaching its conclusion that the agreement was unlawful

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902.
58 Id. at 902-03.
57

5

Id. at 903.

60 Id.
61 Id.
62

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 903.

63 id.
64

Id. at 903-04.
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per se, the court reasoned that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to
assure customers the benefits of price competition, and that this was
an example of customers being injured by higher prices for drugs "as
a result of the contractually mandated absence of competition
between HMR and Andrx. ' '6V The court held that where a per se
approach to antitrust liability applies, there is a presumption of
illegality and no consideration is given to the intent behind the
restraint, or to the restraint's actual effect on competition. 66 In
response to the defendants' arguments that the agreement was an
attempt to enforce patent rights, the court held that this kind of
agreement cannot be characterized as a mere attempt to enforce
patent rights because there is a significant difference between taking
advantage of market exclusivity naturally arising from a patent and
attempting to bolster the patent's effectiveness. 67 Furthermore, the
defendants could not argue that a brand-name drug manufacturer and
a generic applicant were not horizontal competitors because HMR
and Andrx were in fact potential rivals in the market for Cardizem
CD.68 In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit held the agreement between
HMR and Andrx to be unlawful per se, and, consistent with a per se
analysis, it was therefore irrelevant to further investigate any claims
of lacking anticompetitive effects or of the presence of
procompetitive 69effects possibly resulting from the agreement between
the defendants.
B. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc: Using Rule of
Reason Analysis to Consider Patent Considerations as
Exceptions to Antitrust Liability
In direct contrast to the Sixth Circuit Cardizem decision, in
Valley Drug the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements not to compete
between generic and name-brand manufacturers were not unlawful
per se to the extent that they had no broader exclusionary effect than
7
that
providedwas
by not
the patents
in question.
0 The court held that the per
se standard
appropriate
and instead
applied a rule of reason
65

Id. at 904.

66

Id. at 906.

67

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908.

68

Id. at 909.

69

Id.

70 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11 th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
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analysis. Under the rule of reason, a court determines whether certain
behavior violates antitrust laws by examining factors unique to the
businesses, the industry and the specific behavior in question. 7'
In this case, Abbott Laboratories manufactured Hytrin, a very
successful pioneer drug used to treat hypertension and enlarged
prostate.72 Geneva Pharmaceuticals filed multiple ANDAs based on
Hytrin between 1993 and 1996, each time making paragraph IV
certifications, and Abbott filed patent infringement suits in response
thereby triggering the thirty-month stay on Geneva's applications.]7
Included in Geneva's ANDAs were requests for the approval of a
tablet form and a capsule form of the generic alternative to Hytrin. 4
Abbott filed suit claiming that the tablet form of the drug infringed
one of its patents, but failed to file an infringement suit based on the
capsule form, apparently through oversight. 75 The capsule ANDA
was therefore approved by the FDA in March 1998, and the thirtymonth stay that would end in December
1998 applied only to
76
Geneva's ANDA for its tablet product.
Abbott, estimating it would lose approximately $185 million
in Hytrin sales in the first six months of the launch of the generic
drug, entered into a confidential agreement with Geneva in April
1998. 77 The terms of the agreement established that Geneva was not
to market any of its generic Hytrin products until the earlier of either
the final resolution of the infringement lawsuit or the entry into the
market of another generic version of Hytrin; and Geneva would not
forfeit or transfer its 180-day market exclusivity to other generic
applicants. 78 In return, Abbott agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million
monthly until the district court decided the case, and if Geneva
prevailed, Abbott would place $4.5 million each month in escrow
pending the final disposition of the case; the prevailing party would

71
72

White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963).
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1298.

" Id. at 1298-99.
74 Id. at 1299.
75 Id. When Abbott learned of the approval of the generic capsule product, it
attempted to amend its complaint to allege that the capsule was also a patent
infringement. Id.
76 Id.
77
78

Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 301.
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1300.
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79
then get the escrowed funds.
In September 1998, the district court held that Abbott's patent
was invalid because the product claimed in the patent had been on
sale in the United States more than one year before Abbott had even
applied for the patent. 80 However, even though the district court held
that Abbott's patent was invalid, Geneva did not enter the market and
continued to receive payments from Abbott in escrow per the
agreement. 81 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
in July 1999 and Abbott's petition for certiorari was denied in
January 2000.82 Abbott and Geneva terminated their agreement in
August 1999, apparently due
83 to an FTC investigation, and Geneva's
product entered the market.
In reaching its conclusion that the agreement between Abbott
and Geneva was not illegal per se, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the
fact that, because a patent was involved, the case was not simply an
instance of one firm making payments to potential competitors to
keep its product out of the marketplace. 84 The court relied heavily on
the idea that the exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of
the patent grant, and a patentee can choose to exclude everyone from
results in
producing the patented product, even if the agreement
85
lower production and higher prices to the customer.
Ironically, in reaching its conclusion, the court stated that,
while applying per se analysis was inappropriate, applying a rule of
reason analysis was similarly inappropriate. However, it then stated
that the analysis should focus on the facts and on what type of
anticompetitive effects result from the agreement in each individual
set of circumstances. 87 Whereas the Sixth Circuit emphasized thatper
se analysis meant there was no further inquiry necessary into the
intent behind the agreement or its potential anticompetitive or

'9 Id. The final disposition of the case required a judgment from which no
appeal could be taken, including a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id.
80 Id. at 1301.
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1301.

84

Id. at 1304.

" Id. at 1305-06.
86

Id. at 1311.

87

Id. at 1303-04.
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procompetitive effects, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it
respectfully disagreed and held instead that ther0tential exclusionary
power of the patent must first be considered. The court reasoned
that, since there was no categorical line to be drawn between
agreements that create an "obvious inference of anticompetitive
effect and those that call for more detailed treatment," there is
nonetheless a requirement to look to the circumstances, details and
logic of the agreement in each individual case. 89 Despite not wanting
to label its approach as "rule of reason," this type of inquiry into the
particular facts and circumstances
of the case is synonymous with a
90
analysis.
reason
of
rule
On remand, under the direction of the Eleventh Circuit, the
district court first reviewed the facts specific to the case in order to
evaluate the potential exclusionary effect of the patent.91 After
reviewing the facts, the court determined that at the time the
agreement was made the likelihood was that the patent would be
found to be invalid.92 The court therefore concluded that the
agreement exceeded the scope9 3 of the patent and only then held the
agreement to be illegal per se.
C. In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corporation: the Opinion
of the FTC
In 2003, the FTC addressed patent settlements between
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers by issuing an opinion in the
matter of Schering-Plough Corporation, holding that such agreements
between a brand-name drug manufacturer and two generic applicants
were a violation of the Sherman Act. 94 In reaching its conclusion, the
88

Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312.

Id. at 1313. In dismissing the application of rule of reason analysis, the
court held that what was instead required was an analysis of the extent to which
antitrust liability might undermine innovation, or the extent to which the patent
laws prevent antitrust liability for exclusionary agreements. Id. at 1311. The court
did not further explain how this type of analysis should be distinguished from the
rule of reason. Id.
89

90 Id.

9' In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 129499 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
92 Id. at 1299-1307.
9' Id. at 1319-20.
94 FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 86.
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Commission appeared to apply the rule of reason analysis, yet
concluded, similarly to the Sixth Circuit, that the agreements were
unlawful under the Sherman Act. 95 Schering-Plough later appealed
the decision, and the Eleventh Circuit set aside and vacated the order,
holding that the agreements did not violate the Sherman Act because
they did not unreasonably restrain
competition beyond the
96
patent.
the
of
effects
exclusionary
Schering-Plough manufactured K-Dur 20, a prescription drug
used to treat low potassium levels, usually to aid treatment of high
blood pressure or congestive heart disease. 97 In August 1995, UpsherSmith filed an ANDA for a generic version of K-Dur 20, and
Schering sued for patent infringement, thereby triggering the thirtymonth stay that would run until May 1998.98 In June 1997, Schering
and Upsher-Smith agreed to a settlement, wherein Upsher-Smith
promised not to introduce any generic form of K-Dur 20 into the
market until September 2001, infringing or non-infringing, and also
agreed to license five Upsher-Smith products to Schering. 99 Even
though Schering stated that it was not interested in paying UpsherSmith to "stay off the market," in return it agreed to pay them $60
million. 100 The FDA approved Upsher-Smith's ANDA in November
1998, but Upsher-Smith did not begin marketing its products per the
agreement, so its 180-day exclusivity period did not begin to run and
no other generic applicant could enter the market. 10 1
In addition to Upsher-Smith's request for generic approval, in
December 1995, ESI Lederle filed an ANDA for its K-Dur 20 generic
alternative and Schering sued ESI for patent infringement, again
triggering the thirty-month stay.10 2 Ultimately, Schering and ESI
agreed to settle in January 1998, at which time ESI agreed not to
market any generic version of K-Dur 20 before January 2004 and

95 Id.

Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005),
petitionfor cert.filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2005) (No. 05-273).
97 Id. at 1058.
96

98

Id. at 1058-59.

99 Id. at 1059-60.
100 Id. at 1060.
101 Chin
102

& Walsh, supra note 6, at 305.

FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 4.
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1 3
Schering agreed to pay ESI $30 million. 0
The FTC filed an administrative complaint against Schering,
Upsher-Smith and ESI in April 2001, alleging that they had violated
Section 5 of the FTC Act by entering into unlawful agreements to
delay the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to the market. 10 4 In
the initial decision, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed all
charges, stating that the FTC had not met its burden of proving either
invalidity of the Schering patent or non-infringement, without which
it was not possible to conclude that the settlement agreements
delayed generic entry to the marketplace. The Commission, holding
that the complainants were not required to meet this burden, reversed
on appeal and issued an order against Schering-Plough. 10 5 In its
opinion, the FTC ordered Schering and Upsher-Smith to cease and
desist from being parties to any agreement settling a patent
infringement lawsuit where a generic manufacturer (1) received
anything of value, and (2) agreed to suspend research, development,
06
manufacturing or marketing of its product for any period of time.'
Even though the FTC did not hold the agreements unlawful
per se, it concluded that the "quid pro quo" for the payment was an
agreement to defer the introduction of generic drugs to the market
and that such a delay would injure competition and consumers.
The Commission noted that a plaintiff may satisfy its burden of
showing actual or likely market effects by looking at the facts of the
case, without engaging in a full-blown market analysis.' ° 8 In this
case, the fact that the parties agreed to a deferred entry of a potential
competitor that would have certainly reduced sales for Schering was
1 9
0
sufficient to show the anticompetitive nature of the agreements.

103 Id.
'04

Id. The complaint was filed against Schering-Plough Corporation, Upsher-

Smith Laboratories, and American Home Products Corporation. ESI is a division
of American Home Products. Id
105

Id.

106

Id.

107 Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005),
petitionfor cert.filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2005) (No. 05-273).
108 FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 16 (citing F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)).
109 Id. at 20. The Commission pointed to Schering's 1997 Operating Plan
showing that Schering anticipate their sales to drop significantly if a competing
generic drug were to enter the market. Id. Schering projected its K-Dur revenues
to drop from $190 million in 1997 to just $70 million by 2001. Id. After the

380

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

Furthermore, the Commission stated that a presumptively legal patent
does not confer the right to preclude generic entry, and the validity of
the patent is not at issue if the settlement
in question resulted in a
10
later entry of the generic product."
By applying a rule of reason analysis and examining the
specific facts of the case, the FTC held that the agreements were in
fact unlawful."1 Interestingly, while the FTC clearly stated that the
agreements were not unlawful per se, it is difficult to see how
applying the Commission's reasoning to future cases
could lead to
112
any other finding than a violation of antitrust laws.

IV. Horizontal Trade Agreements Between Pioneer
Drug Manufacturers and Generic Competitors
Should Be Considered Unlawful per se
A review of the Sixth Circuit Cardizem and Eleventh Circuit
Valley Drug decisions, in conjunction with the FTC Schering-Plough
opinion, highlights the mixed standards that the courts are applying to
reverse payments resulting from patent infringement litigation under
the Hatch-Waxman Act. On one hand, there is the notion that such
agreements are per se violations of the Sherman Act and no further
factual inquiry is required. On the other, there is the idea of applying
a "rule of reason" analysis, which has been interpreted differently by
various courts resulting in little guidance for those in the
pharmaceutical industry.
The significance of this issue cannot be understated. In 2003,
Americans spent $179 billion on prescription drugs, representing
roughly 1.5% of the Gross National Product, and just over ten percent
of all health care expenditures." 3 That number is projected to grow to
$480 billion by 2013.114 Furthermore, the effect of hindering a
generic drug's entrance to the market has a significant impact on the
consumer. As of 2004, forty-eight percent of all prescription drugs
settlement which deferred the introduction of a generic drug, Schering's next 1998
Operating Plan projected increased K-Dur sales through 2000. Id.
"0 Id. at 30.

i" Id. at 10.
112

Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 307.

U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 2006, Section 3
Health & Nutrition,, Tables 118 and 119, (2006) available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/health.pdf.
113

114

Id.

2006]

Infringement Lawsuits

sold were generic drugs, up from forty percent in 1995. Such an
increase is not surprising considering the average cost of a brandname drug prescription was ninety-six dollars in 2004 compared to
just twenty-nine dollars for the generic equivalent. 1 5 Despite the
magnitude of some of these numbers and the impact on consumers of
all ages and demographics, the Supreme Court has yet to grant
certiorari and establish a standard for courts and professionals in the
pharmaceutical industry to apply when considering a potential
agreement in lieu of patent infringement litigation.
These types of agreements between pioneer and genetic drug
manufacturers should be considered unlawful per se for several
reasons. First, this is a very specific situation that arises between the
pioneer and generic manufacturers and would not require the courts
to apply a sweeping per se standard to various areas of patent law
analysis. Second, holding such agreements to be unlawful per se
would eliminate the confusion clearly highlighted by the circuit split
as well as reduce the costs associated with litigation. Third, and
perhaps most importantly, applying a per se standard to non-compete
agreements would be consistent with the intent behind the HatchWaxman Act as it would benefit consumers by facilitating the entry
of generic drugs to the marketplace.
A. The Per Se Antitrust Analysis Would Be Limited to this
Narrow Area of Patent Law
In general, courts are not eager to extend the reach of per se
analysis because it makes a certain practice unlawful, regardless of6
the surrounding facts and circumstances specific to that case."l
However, in some limited circumstances per se analysis is not only
appropriate, but also preferred because it provides a bright line rule
for the courts and for parties who find themselves confronted with
those limited circumstances. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that per se rules often still require an inquiry into market
conditions before it is justifiable to apply a presumption of

"' Id. at Table 126 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores, Pharmacy
Industry Profile 2005).
116 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986)

("[W]e have been slow .. . to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the
context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is
not immediate obvious") (citation omitted); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) ("We have said that per se rules are appropriate
only for conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive") (citation omitted).
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anticompetitive conduct and pronouncement of per se analysis.1 17 In
other words, a situation or practice needs to meet the specific
behavior that has been deemed unlawful per se, and some form of
inquiry into the facts at hand is necessary in order to do so. In regard
to the types of agreements highlighted in the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuit decisions, the courts would first have to come to the
conclusion that such an agreement was a horizontal restraint of trade
before applying the per se analysis.
By limiting the use of per se analysis to reverse payments
agreed to between pioneer and generic drug manufacturers to delay
the entry of a competing generic drug, this would not have the
adverse effect of stifling innovation and the development of new
products which is so important across multiple industries. Certainly, a
major source of the tension between patent law and antitrust law is
due to the recognition of the benefits of pharmaceutical innovation
such as increased life expectancy, overall quality of life and
economic growth. 18 However, applying a per se analysis to this
specific set of circumstances still allows and promotes continued
research, development and ingenuity, because the vast majority of
antitrust inquiries into patent law apply the rule of reason. As the
FTC acknowledged in its Schering-Plough opinion, one must look at
antitrust analysis as a continuum that ranges from per se
condemnation of particularly anticompetitive conduct to a closer
detailed and fact-finding approach toward more ambiguous
behavior. 120 Non-compete
agreements
between the drug
manufacturers are not ambiguous. As the Sixth Circuit held, there
was "simply no escaping the conclusion" that the agreement not to
compete was a horizontal agreement not to compete, something that
121
has repeatedly been held by the Supreme Court as unlawful per se.
117 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984).
118 Stephen A. Stack, Jr., Afterword: Some Further Observations on the
"PharmaceuticalWars, "71 ANTITRUST L.J. 705, 711 (2003).
1'9 Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 272. (discussing several types of

agreements such as refusals to license, tie-ins, and patent pools and highlighting

how a factual-based analysis is applied to determine antitrust liability. Factors that
are typically reviewed include the business context of the transaction and the
business reasons for the deal, market analysis, a review of the services and
geographic areas that will be affected by the transaction, and the market share of

the parties involved).
120 FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 7.
121 In

re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2002),
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In regard to per se rules when considering antitrust liability, the Court
has stated that:
Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with
little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what
courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman
Act .... Congress... can, of course, make per se rules
inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to
ramble through the wilds of122economic theory in order to
maintain a flexible approach.
Should the Supreme Court choose to grant certiorari on this
issue, adopting the per se standard of unlawfulness in regard to
horizontal non-compete agreements between drug manufacturers
in the context of
would still leave endless "wilds" to ramble through
123
law.
antitrust
and
rights
property
intellectual
B. Establishing a Bright Line Rule Would Eliminate Confusion
and Provide Guidance and Predictability to the Courts and
the Pharmaceutical Industry
If the circuit split shows anything, it shows that there is
confusion not only in terms of which type of analysis to apply, but
that if anything but a per se analysis is used, courts are likely to reach
very different results. The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug and in
Schering-Plough repeatedly stated that rule of reason analysis was
not appropriate for these types of agreements, then proceeded to
"quintessentially apply" what appeared to be a rule of reason
analysis.' 24 If this is acceptable, what standard are the courts,
attorneys and members of the pharmaceutical industry to follow? The
FTC repeatedly stated its hesitancy to apply a per se standard, but in
undergoing the same factual inquiry as the Eleventh Circuit came up
with a completely different result and held the agreements to be

cert. denied sub nom., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
122 U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
See generally Chin & Walsh, supra note 6 (reviewing general principles of
antitrust analysis of transactions involving intellectual property rights. In doing so,
123

the authors refer to numerous types of transactions, and refer to a fact-specific
analysis and a standard of reasonableness in regard to all transactions. The only
reference to per se analysis is in regard to the circuit split at the focus of this
article).
124 Id. at 307-08.
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unlawful. 2 ' Adopting a per se analysis as the appropriate standard
with which to review non-compete agreements between generic and
pioneer drug manufacturers would provide predictability for
members of the pharmaceutical industry and guidance when faced
with pending patent infringement litigation.
If the per se analysis were abandoned in favor of a more factbased rule of reason inquiry, the likelihood of eliminating confusion
and minimizing the cost of litigation would be low. As the Supreme
Court has held, courts are not good at examining difficult economic
problems. 12 6 Further, their inability to weigh, "in any meaningful
sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another," is one of the main
reasons per se rules were formulated in the first place. 127 While it is
unknown how the Supreme Court would rule on this particular issue,
if the opinion of the FTC is of any influence, the Commission's
comments in the Schering-Plough opinion certainly suggest a
hesitancy to engage in full-blown market analysis to determine
28 the
potential anticompetitive effects of these kinds of agreements.1
In addition to having to scrutinize the facts of the case and
conduct market research that would accurately predict the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement, courts would have to also
try and determine the odds of ultimate success in the patent
infringement litigation between the parties. 129 In other words, if it
was likely that the court would find the patent invalid, or not
infringed, then perhaps the agreement was more anticompetitive in
nature than if the patent owner had a high likelihood of winning the
infringement suit. The difficulties of playing this type of
predictability game "cannot be underestimated" and are risky both in
the cost and the inefficiency of trying to assign probabilities to
litigation outcomes.' Because the courts are not skilled at this type
of analysis, and the cost of doing so would be great, the per se
analysis is a far better approach than the rule of reason which could
entail risky speculation. The system should work as it was designed;
if the patent owner has a valid claim, the suit should continue, and the
125

FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 86-87.

126

Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 610.

127

Id. at 609-10.

128

FTC Opinion, supra note 51, at 16-19.

129

Stack, supra note 118, at 714.

130

Id.
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patent will protect the pioneer manufacturer. If the patent owner does
not have a valid claim, the generic manufacturer should have a right
to move forward with development and marketing of the new product
to the consumer.
Finally, one could argue that under a per se analysis, there is
the risk that an agreement would be condemned which, under the rule
of reason analysis, would have otherwise been permitted. While this
is a possibility, the reason why this specific type of agreement is
analyzed under a per se analysis is because it so closely fits the mold
of a horizontal restraint of trade that has repeatedly been held as a per
se violation of the Sherman Act.131 Additionally, the Court has said
that this risk has been recognized and tolerated as a necessary
' 32 cost
"[f]or the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency.'
C. Holding These Agreements Unlawful Per Se Meets the
Purpose of the Sherman Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act and
Works Toward the Benefit of the Consumer
Not only would the per se analysis be limited to a specific
type of agreement between competitors and eliminate confusion in
the courts and the pharmaceutical industry, but it would also, possibly
most importantly, reflect the intent of relevant legislation and protect
the consumer. The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to make it
easier to introduce lower-cost generic drugs into the market while
continuing to encourage the pioneer drug manufacturers to make the
necessary investments to research and develop new products.' 33 The
amendments to the Act that resulted from the Medicare Act of 2003
were implemented in order to make it even easier to allow generic
drugs to enter the marketplace.' 34 Applying a per se standard to these
non-compete agreements certainly appears to be in line with the
legislature's consistent efforts toward facilitating generic entry into

131

See, e.g., Nat. Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. U.S. 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)

("[A]n agreement that interferes with the setting of price by free market forces is
illegal on its face.") (citation omitted); U.S. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. 351 U.S.
305, 309-10 (1956) ("It has been held too often to require elaboration now that
price fixing is contrary to the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act
and that its illegality does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness, since it
is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable").
132 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
133Narinder Banait, Authorized Generics: Antitrust Issues and the HatchWaxman Act, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Nov. 4,2005.
134Id.

386

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

the marketplace.
In addition to promoting the entry of generic drugs into the
market, the per se standard would not significantly hinder the
incentive for the pioneer manufacturers to develop new drugs. The
Hatch-Waxman Act has been credited with greatly expanding
consumer access to generic drugs, from roughly nineteen percent of
the pharmaceutical market in 1984 to fifty-seven percent of the
market in 2005.135 Yet, while the generic drugs saw a significant
increase in the percentage of drugs sold, pharmaceutical companies
have continued to invest in science and new technology.' 36 Prior to
the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, in 1980 pharmaceutical
manufacturers spent a combined $2 billion on the research and
development of new drugs, and in 2004, that number was $39
billion. 37 Applying a per se analysis to reverse payment agreements
between competing drug manufacturers would unlikely have
anywhere near the impact that the Hatch-Waxman Act had on
increasing the percentage of generic drugs in the marketplace. It is
therefore difficult to argue that applying such an analysis in a limited
set of circumstances would stifle the -investment and innovation so
critical to the pharmaceutical industry.
Finally, those who oppose a per se analysis of non-compete
agreements between pioneer and generic drug manufacturers may
argue that the reverse payment agreements may actually benefit both
companies financially, but the intent of Congress was not to make
money for the pharmaceutical industry. 138 If the payment is part of a
settlement, the patent owner wins because a defeat in the patent
litigation could have a severe financial impact.139 On the other side, if
the generic manufacturer were to lose in litigation, they would have
nothing to show for its efforts, whereas a settlement agreement might
allow the generic competitor to reach an agreed-upon date for market
entry, and would likely ensure compensation for the time that it

See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PHRMA),
Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2005-2006
at
20,
available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/AnnualReport20052006.pdf.
136 Id. at 14-15.
135

137 Id. at 19.
138

Sean R. Sullivan, Where Antitrust Law and Patent Infringement Intersect:

Clear Standards Needed in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 232
INTELLIGENCER, 100 (May 23, 2005).
139 Id.
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abstains from entering the market. 40 These are valid considerations
from the business perspectives of the pharmaceutical companies, but
while the two manufacturers would possibly be better off financially
as a result of the agreement, it would make the consumers worse off,
because their access to low-cost generic alternatives would be
delayed. The purposes of the Sherman and Hatch-Waxman Acts were
to increase competition and make generic drugs available to the
consumer. Holding reverse payment agreements not to compete as
per se violations of the Sherman Act is consistent with this intent.

V.

Conclusion

In general, the ideals behind antitrust law and intellectual
property rights or patent law do overlap in that they are in place to
protect consumer welfare. 14 However, enforcement of both types of
law can lead to conflict in interpreting certain types of behavior, in
particular in the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, the FTC has
targeted the health care market because it has such a tremendous
impact on consumers.142 The circuit split between the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits reflects the varying opinions in regard to the
appropriate type of analysis when looking at agreements between
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers arising from patent
infringement litigation.
The Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari in regard to this
issue, but several notions suggest that the Sixth Circuit was correct in
holding such agreements to be unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act. The per se analysis would be limited to this particular type of
scenario, members of the pharmaceutical industry would have a
bright line rule to follow when considering the impact of such
agreements, and the courts would not have to engage in a fact-finding
economic analysis in order to try and predict the potential
anticompetitive effects. Finally, the legislative intent behind the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the Sherman Act would be upheld in that
low-cost generic drugs would be released to the market in a timely
manner, ultimately benefiting the consumer.
According to a survey conducted in 2000, over ninety percent

140 Id.
141

Chin & Walsh, supra note 6, at 271.

142 Diane Green-Kelly, FTC and U.S. Courts Raise Questions About Legality
of Pharmaceutical Patent Suit Settlements, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Sept. 10,

2004.
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of Americans reported that they had taken prescription drugs, and
more than half said that they took prescription drugs on a regular
basis. 143 Among the elderly, eighty-two percent reported that they
regularly relied on prescription drugs.' 44 At the same time, twentyfive percent of Americans reported that their prescription drugs were
not covered by their health insurance plans, and close to thirty
percent reported that they had not filled a prescription because of the
Cost. 14 5 American drug prices remain the highest in the world, and
despite Congress' efforts to facilitate the entry of low-cost generic
drugs to the marketplace, there is still the potential for delay when a
patent infringement suit arises and the pioneer and generic
manufacturers agree not to compete. This is an important issue and
allowing generic drugs to enter the marketplace quickly is best served
by applying a per se analysis to horizontal non-compete agreements
arising from patent infringement litigation.

Harvard School of Pub. Health, Kaiser Family Foundation, & The
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Prescription Survey Summary (2000), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/prescriptions/survey-summary.html.
144 Id.
143

145

Id.

